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Abstract 
Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We 
propose an explanation that challenges the current focus on material and 
organizational factors and instead brings back and emphasizes the role of ideology. We 
argue that the ideological frameworks of armed groups, whether state or non-state, 
condition their decisions about targeting, in some cases setting normative constraints 
on action even if such choice involves higher costs and risks. We examine these 
hypotheses using a mixed-method approach that combines a statistical analysis of 
newly constructed disaggregated data set on all fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict 
between 1969 and 2005 with a comparative historical study of the interaction between 
key ideologies and the armed groups that adopted them.  
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On Sunday, August 10, 2014, in the city of Mayadin in Deir Al Zor province of Syria, the 
militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) crucified two men from 
the Al Sheitaat tribe for “dealing with apostates,” followed by two others in 
neighbouring Al Bulel for blasphemy.1 In subsequent days, Isil, which earlier took over 
two large oil fields in the province, executed 700 members of the Al Sheitaat, mostly 
civilians, by shooting or beheading them.2 Fighting in the same war for apparently 
similar goals of taking control of territory en route to building a state, a few dozen 
miles north from Isil capital Al-Raqqah, the Kurdish forces - People’s Protection Units 
(YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) - have largely adhered to strict targeting 
norms by focusing their war on combatants.3 Differences in patterns of violence are 
endemic across fighting groups in civil wars in various parts of the world,4 and about 
40 per cent of states and rebels exercise restraint in their violence against civilians.5 
What accounts for this variation?  
There has been a proliferation of theories that aim to solve this puzzle. Studies derived 
from the “economic turn” in the study of civil war6 and the “organizational turn”7 argue 
that civilian victimization is determined by material factors and the organization of 
armed groups. Another influential account stresses the armed groups’ control of 
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territory as an explanation for levels and types of violence.8 A visible thread connecting 
these different strands of research is the role they attribute to ideology, which ranges 
from a nuanced downplaying to an outright rejection of it as a mere rhetorical device. 
Such de-ideologization has not been unique to civil war studies. It has been part of the 
larger trend in social sciences that misperceived the advent of a post-ideological world 
at the end of the Cold War. Yet, few studies of civil war violence that discard the role of 
ideology systematically account for it. 
In this article, we seek to address these theoretical and empirical gaps. Drawing on 
historical sociology, qualitative comparative work on civil wars, and nascent political 
science literature that aims to correct the lacuna in research on civil wars by 
reaffirming the importance, if not centrality, of political and ideological factors,9 we 
theorize that armed group ideology is a critical factor explaining the variation in 
civilian victimization across groups. We conceptualize ideology as a “shared 
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provides both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment 
should be structured”.10 We argue that in the context of civil wars the targeting 
patterns of belligerents are conditioned by their ideologies which simplify, shape, and 
crystallize salient or latent social cleavages and thus identify who and what is a 
“legitimate target” given their actual or potential opposition to the belligerents’ cause. 
Furthermore, ideology affects targeting patterns through filtering the belligerents’ 
strategy set, because the interpretation of the environment and its remolded “ideal 
state” image enable some options and discard others. Finally, ideologies can also shape 
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the economic, strategic, and organizational choices of belligerents rather than being 
separate from or endogenous to them.  
We examine the hypothesis that group ideology explains civilian victimization using a 
mixed-method approach. We combine a statistical analysis of a sub-national and 
group-level dataset of fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict between 1969 and 2005 
constructed by us from existing sources, with a brief comparative historical study of 
the interaction between key ideologies and armed groups that adopted them. We find 
that fighting group ideologies are the most robust predictors of civilian victimization, 
controlling for other factors. Armed groups with Unionist ideology were consistently 
more likely to target civilians and engage in cross-ethnic attacks on civilians, while 
Republican armed groups were significantly more likely to target combatants. These 
results survive multiple robustness checks. We trace these targeting differences to 
path-dependent norms, recruitment patterns, and relations with the British armed 
forces during the conflict. 
This article contributes to our knowledge of civil war violence in three domains. First, 
our research advances a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship 
between ideology and civilian victimization. Humphreys and Weinstein implicitly 
bring ideology back into political science analysis of violence against civilians in civil 
wars, yet as a factor dependent on the resource endowments of armed groups and not 
as an autonomous factor.11  Moreover, their conceptualization and measurement of 
ideology is indirect, broad, and dichotomous: it is understood as combatants’ 
perceptions of collective goals versus private goals. Yet, the nature and specific 
elements of these goals – that is, features of different ideologies, which are likely to 
have different effects – remain unspecified and unexplored. Finally, as Humphreys and 
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Weinstein acknowledge, given their model’s assumptions, their argument is not likely 
to explain cases where civilian victimization is a conscious group strategy or where 
leaders order civilian abuse even if it may run against the aggregate interests of 
individual members of their group. 
Second, we show empirically the autonomous effect of group ideology on civilian 
victimization in civil wars while systematically accounting for alternative explanations. 
For example, while Thaler argues that ideology shapes the use of selective versus 
indiscriminate violence, his findings are limited given his qualitative analysis of only 
two groups in two different contexts12 – Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in 
Angola, and because such analysis does not systematically account for other factors. 
We rectify this by examining the targeting behavior of fifteen different armed groups 
fighting in the same civil war and by explicitly and simultaneously controlling for their 
various characteristics. Thus, our research also contributes to promoting micro-level 
analyses for understanding the underpinnings of civil war violence.13 
Finally, this article significantly advances the debates on patterns of violence in the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, which is one of the most studied from an area studies 
perspective but which is as yet poorly integrated into the comparative study of civil 
war.  Our contribution here is twofold. First, a number of studies have argued that 
ideological differences are important factors in decoding the patterns of violence in 
this conflict; others have disputed this; some studies have not been immune to 
ideological biases themselves.14 However, their research designs – centered on broad 
qualitative explorations and bivariate correlations that do not systematically account 
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for potential confounders – are in effect descriptive rather than explanatory: they do 
not allow assessing the independent effects of different factors. Our study presents a 
story arrived at through a research design that evaluates the role of different factors in 
a systematic and explicit fashion. Second, it is based on a novel dataset that combines 
the strengths of all existing sources of data on the fatalities in the Northern Ireland 
conflict and includes original components that code the characteristics of armed 
groups and localities of civilian victimization.  
THEORIES OF CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION 
A fundamental assumption in the study of intra-state conflict is that the support of the 
general population for a belligerent party is critical to the success of that party.15 
Therefore, if insurgents enjoy support from the population, they are expected to be less 
likely to engage in civilian victimization. In addition, if enemy forces perceive that 
local populations support their rival, they can raise the costs of such support by 
punishing civilians.16 Overall, armed groups are less likely to target co-ethnic civilians 
or their ideological home communities, especially when these serve as their 
recruitment base.17  
Recent research brings more nuances to the question of allegiances and draws 
attention to factors previously ignored in large-N studies of civil wars – political and 
ethnic cleavages. Direct violence against civilians in conventional civil wars can be 
explained by the degree of pre-war political mobilization and competition: individuals 
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who are mobilized for an armed group are targeted by opposing groups because they 
are seen as assets for their rivals.18 In addition, ethnic affiliation can be key to targeting 
because it can serve as a shortcut to identifying groups of suspected enemy supporters 
when affiliations are not known for certain.19  
Third, the influential study by Kalyvas postulated that the scale of indiscriminate 
violence in civil wars depends on the degree of control that a belligerent exercises over 
territory: the less territorial control there is, the more likely it is that there will be 
“indirect” indiscriminate targeting resulting in higher levels of civilian victimization.20  
Fourth, the belligerents’ capabilities can also affect patterns of violence against 
civilians, with weak or weakening capacity of belligerents resulting in more collateral 
damage caused by the groups’ operations and through deliberate strategies of 
victimizing civilians to close the “capability gap.”21  
However, capabilities derive partly from material sources, and depending on the 
source, armed groups may be more or less prone to target civilians. Groups which 
secure external funding – such as natural resource rents or foreign sponsorship – may 
be more likely to target civilians than groups that rely on the local populations for 
material support.22 Yet, different forms of external funding – e.g., foreign aid or 
lootable resources – may have different effects.23 The number of donors and their 
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characteristics can matter, too.24 A similar logic may apply to governments, not just 
insurgents: larger resources, such as overseas development aid, may increase the 
capacity of governments to defeat insurgents.25  
Finally, violence against civilians can also depend on the organizational characteristics 
of combatants: material incentives in recruitment, ethnic heterogeneity, and lack of 
disciplinary mechanisms within warring groups can entail higher civilian abuse.26 
WHY IDEOLOGY MATTERS 
Much of the civil war scholarship in political science and economics at the end of the 
20th century and the first decade of the 21st assumes rational self-seeking motivations of 
leaders, recruits, and groups in initiating, joining, or conducting civil war, thus either 
relegating ideas and other-regarding preferences to a role of explaining residual 
variation or discarding them altogether. Why this assumption took hold can probably 
be traced to five factors. First, it was a reaction to the often unsystematic examination 
of ideological explanations in much of the historical and qualitative literature on civil 
wars, where the importance of ideology is taken as a convention. Second, it followed a 
seeming de-ideologization of the international system in the wake of the fall of 
communism and a seeming triumph of liberal democracy. Third, and related to the 
previous, it reflected a shifting of the focus from “ideological Che Guevaras in favor of 
the predatory Charles Taylors”.27 This paradigm shifting in turn reflected actual 
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changes: the fall of communism, the shattering of Marxist ideologies and end of the 
Cold War undermined the core foundations of secular revolutionary movements, and 
ended the abundant material support from the Superpowers, which in turn induced 
other forms of raising funds that advantaged the Charles Taylor types.28 Fourth, the 
prevailing assumption of self-seeking motivations as the core explanation for human 
behavior mirrored mainstream beliefs in economics, which heavily influenced political 
science research.29 Finally, such assumptions were partly reinforced by a lack of 
disaggregated data as well as poor conceptualization, weak design, and doubtful 
proxies. Many studies that emphasized micro-level foundations in fact used 
suboptimal country-level proxies.30  
However, a recent study by Sanín and Wood suggests that ideology can matter in civil 
wars in general, noting that ideologies may constrain the group from violence 
altogether or may justify violent over nonviolent strategies.31 Regarding the conflict 
onset, for example, the combination of nationalism - an ideology of ‘political self-rule’32 
– and democratization can make newly democratizing states prone to inter-state 
violence and civil war.33 Evidence from India and Pakistan also suggests that patterns 
of militia–state relations depend heavily on ruling elites’ ideological projects.34 
Revolutionary beliefs constitute a critical component of robust insurgency35 because 
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cognitive frames and ideologies can arouse "passionate ideological commitments 
among combatants, both domestically and internationally"36 and spur armed 
mobilization.37 For instance, survey evidence from Colombia shows that recruits who 
joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect and more likely to switch sides or 
demobilize if they perceive their group as deviating from its ideological principles.38 By 
boosting combat morale, ideology can be a force multiplier, increasing the combat 
capacity of the group.39 Ideology can also be crucial in determining the allegiances of 
civilians and their role in the production of violence.40 Civil wars can be more 
protracted when rebels recruit from and fight on behalf of excluded ethnic groups 
because in such cases rebels have stronger collective solidarity and higher risk 
tolerance.41 Finally, in terrorism research, ideology is identified as one of the key 
factors in target selection.42 
We argue that ideology is also an overlooked factor in accounting for different patterns 
of targeting in civil war. First, the ideologies generated or adopted by armed groups are 
likely to create threat perceptions that determine decisions about who friends and foes 
are and, thus, who legitimate targets potentially are in violent conflict. Ideology frames 
the preferences and beliefs of belligerents, shapes debates about the nature of 
community, and identifies obstacles to the realization of the belligerents’ vision of the 
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desirable state of affairs.43 In civil wars, the targeting by armed groups is likely to 
reflect salient or latent political cleavages within the community, and the more so, the 
higher is the extent to which these cleavages have been crystallized in ideologies.  
While geographic areas can mark ethnic or political constituency territories,44 focusing 
on them may not reveal important differences in who exactly is targeted by armed 
groups. It is not likely to be any civilian who will be subject to violence within a given 
area but rather the civilians of a particular social group who are associated in the eyes 
of the perpetrating belligerent with a particular enemy. Contrary to assumptions of 
many existing studies, we hold that in civil wars the conceptual clustering of civilians 
into homogenous groups of “civilian population” or “local population” is misplaced, 
even within a given geographic or constituency area. If the salient and mobilized 
cleavages are ethnic or religious, for example, then we should expect these to be 
reflected in patterns of violence regardless of geography. We surmise that an armed 
group is more (less) likely to victimize a civilian if the civilian is a member of the group 
which the armed group identifies as hostile (supportive) to its cause. 
Yet, an armed group’s treatment of civilians of a specific group as opponents or of 
civilians in general as irrelevant actors is not likely to automatically lead to their 
targeting by the armed group. We differ from the analyses of Balcells, and Fjelde and 
Hultman45 in arguing that belligerents’ ideology affects their targeting patterns also by 
filtering their strategy set and that some types of violence are excluded from a 
belligerent’s repertoire of violence not because they would not have strategic benefit or 
may incur punitive costs but because their use would undermine the group’s 
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ideological commitments, particularly its identity and values as a certain kind of 
ideological or moral force. Targeting civilians or engaging in rape may be proscribed by 
the belligerent because its ideology includes a claim to better represent and govern 
civilians than its adversaries. More fundamentally, its ideology may constrain the 
group from civilian violence altogether and justify nonviolent over violent strategies.46 
However, since ideological commitments are norms, with some prescribing restraint 
while others sanction non-restraint and excess, different ideologies decrease and 
others increase the likelihood of civilian victimization.47 This applies to victimization 
both of civilians in general and of civilians of a specific group seen as opponents. 
The next logical question is: which ideologies are more and which are less conducive to 
civilian victimization? While this can ultimately be an empirical question, the 
prospects of building an ex ante taxonomy of ideologies by their likelihood of entailing 
civilian victimization is complicated. As Drake argues in the case of terrorist 
organizations, the targeting patterns might differ not only between groups with 
different ideologies, but also between organizations with apparently similar ones, such 
as the communist groups in Europe between 1970s and 1990s, because “ideology and 
strategy have been adapted to local conditions.”48 Similarly, conceptualizing them in 
broad categories, such as “religious ideologies” or “groups with a democratic 
ideology”,49 is likely to be misguided as it is plausible that while one religious ideology 
prescribes targeting of civilians, another strongly proscribes it. Therefore, to 
understand its effect on civilian victimization we may need an understanding of what the 
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armed group’s ideology is in a particular conflict context, and how it orders the worlds of 
the belligerents and shapes the normative environment in which violence is enacted.  
Furthermore, the extent to which ideological differences explain variation in group 
institutions, perceptions of and responses to strategic incentives, and processes of 
mobilization is yet under-explored.50 Such differences are often treated as exogenous 
with little effort to assess their possibly ideological origins.51 This is an important 
question, the answering of which can help avoid attributing violence against civilians 
to epiphenomenal factors. For instance, recruitment and discipline may depend on 
prior ideological commitment or the ideological projects of belligerents. Groups can 
choose to organize around common goals, to form ethnically homogenous units, and 
to set in place disciplinary structures due to their ideological commitments. For 
example, studies of Islamist violence find that religious sectarianism underpins 
organizational structures of armed Islamist groups,52 as well as providing strategic 
guidance about how and where it is legitimate to fight jihad.53  
EXPLAINING CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Given the complex nature and dynamics of civil wars, understanding the patterns of 
civilian victimization is complicated by the difficulty of obtaining accurate micro-level 
data on victims, characteristics of the perpetrators, and the locations where the 
victimization took place. In this article, we use an original dataset that combines 
micro-level evidence on all killings in Northern Ireland’s civil war and on fifteen 
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organizations responsible for them. Examining the patterns of violence against 
civilians across multiple groups of perpetrators within the same civil war – as opposed 
to studying the behavior of different groups in different contexts – has an advantage of 
helping isolate the effects of group-level factors from country- or international-level 
institutional, political, and social differences that potentially affect civilian 
victimization patterns. In line with our theoretical reasoning, focusing the analysis on 
the sub-national level also helps to see the meaning and impact of ideology, if any, in 
context. 
Northern Ireland’s “Long War”  
Three reasons make the case of Northern Ireland’s ‘Long War” a fertile ground for 
studying the causes of civilian victimization in civil wars.54 First, the conflict involved a 
range of different fighting factions that exhibited different capabilities, sources of 
funding, organizational structures, etc. Second, there was a significant variation in 
civilian victimization patterns across armed blocs, specific organizations, time, and 
location. Finally, the availability of wide-ranging data sources on fatalities of the 
Northern Ireland conflict from three different sources55  enables a systematic micro-
level analysis of the covariates of civilian targeting.56 
The targeting patterns of armed groups in Northern Ireland have been subject to 
considerable debate. The focus has been on the extent to which major Loyalist and 
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Republican armed groups were ideological in their use of violence against the Catholic 
and Protestant communities, respectively. On the one hand, White contends that the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) attacks reveal a pattern of non-sectarian 
targeting of its key strategic adversary – security forces, while the Loyalist 
paramilitaries were sectarian in their victim selection.57 Focusing on PIRA violence, 
O’Leary argues that IRA violence “has been primarily strategic, aimed at its official 
legitimate targets, rather than sectarian”.58 However, according to Bruce, since the 
majority of local security force personnel were Protestants, their targeting by PIRA 
should be seen as sectarian as well.59  O’Duffy finds that instrumental, tactical and 
strategic choices related to ethno-national goals rather than affective factors governed 
the targeting patterns by both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries.60 Drake largely 
builds on the previous accounts to argue for an explicit role of ideology as a primary 
factor motivating target selection for terrorist groups in Northern Ireland and 
beyond.61  
Several problems complicate drawing conclusions from these studies. First, since their 
methodologies are based mostly on correlations, they do not allow accounting 
systematically for the role of other group-level factors. Second, the violence of state 
forces as well as by smaller paramilitary groups is largely absent from systematic 
incorporation into these studies. Yet, since state forces are belligerents and adopt 
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coercive strategies similar to those of non-state actors,62 we do not see an a priori 
reason for excluding them from the analysis. Third, there is little systematic 
disaggregation by organization within each camp, despite their significant differences. 
Fourth, by framing the issue around the term “sectarianism” many studies seem to 
suggest the prevalence of ideological factors, but the role of ideology in explaining 
varying levels of civilian victimization remains under-theorized and under-investigated 
empirically. Finally, while some studies take precaution to avoid this,63 in effect the 
term “sectarianism” is often applied loosely, to denote perpetration of any violence 
across ethnic or religious divides whatever the intention. However, such violence may 
not necessarily be deliberate or selective and may result from a motivation entirely 
different from aiming to inflict damage onto a member of a rival ethnic group, such as 
when acts of economic sabotage or other attacks cause collateral damage. 
The Data: Fatalities, Organizations, and Constituencies 
Our dataset, constructed between 2008 and 2015, has three components. The first 
component contains data on all 3,702 fatalities in the Northern Ireland conflict 
between 1969 and 2005 and is created from the merger of three existing sources by 
McKeown, Sutton, and McKittrick et al.64 While the first two are datasets, the latter 
provides detailed qualitative information on all fatalities, which we used for coding 
new variables. Since we systematically checked and corrected inconsistencies, our 
dataset combines the strengths of these separate sources, reduces their weaknesses 
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through streamlining and superior coding, and adds new variables.65 Our dataset 
allows us to go beyond counts of casualties conventionally resorted to in existing 
studies due to the lack of micro-level data and analyze the covariates of targeting at 
the individual victim level. 
The second component contains details on fifteen organizations responsible for 
killings during the conflict. This allows us to analyze evidence on two levels: the more 
specific fighting group level and the broader level by fighting blocs – loyalist, 
republican, and state forces. The group-level variables, including the organization’s 
base territories, co-ethnic areas, capabilities, external resources, structure, and 
ideology, were coded through an extensive study and triangulation of a large array of 
government, media, and academic sources.  
Finally, the third component is made up of variables on eighteen Northern Ireland 
parliamentary constituencies,66 such as their population size, religious breakdown, 
electoral support for Unionist and Nationalist parties, military presence, and so on, 
that date back to 1969 and are coded from a variety of census and electoral data. This 
component allows exploring sub-national variation in civilian victimization, 
particularly in combination with the characteristics of armed groups.67  
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Our unit of analysis is an armed group. In a departure from much of the existing 
literature, we include in this definition the state security forces - British Army, Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).68  
Throughout the analysis we distinguish six periods of the conflict defined by key 
shaping policies or events: from the onset of mass violence in summer 1969 to the end 
of 1971; from Bloody Sunday in January 1972 until the introduction of the policies of 
Ulsterization, "normalization" and "criminalization" in late 1975; 1976 to the 
Republican hunger strikes in 1981; 1982 to the end of 1989 when the British government 
admitted that the PIRA could not be defeated militarily; 1990 to the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA); and post-1998 until the end of 2005 when PIRA and other major 
groups declared the end of their armed campaigns and confirmed decommissioning of  
their weapons and the “end of the war.” 
Patterns of Violence 
Figure 1 shows that there was a significant variation in civilian victimization between 
different armed blocs and time periods, with Republican paramilitaries responsible for 
the largest number of casualties overall and Loyalist paramilitaries responsible for the 
largest number of civilian casualties. State forces were responsible for fewer civilian 
killings compared with the Loyalist and Republican armed blocs and were more likely 
than Loyalist paramilitaries to target combatants. 
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Figure 1. Casualties by Perpetrator Armed Blocs over Time 
All Violence Volitional Violence 
  
 
Equally important is to determine who targeted whom. Figure 2 relates targeting by 
the three armed blocs to the victimized noncombatants’ religious background. It 
suggests four key patterns. 
First, in each period Loyalist paramilitaries targeted considerably more Catholic 
civilians. Similarly, Republican paramilitaries were more likely to target Protestant 
civilians, but proportions by civilians’ ethno-religious background are not as stark. 
Second, state forces targeted disproportionately more Catholic civilians. Overall, these 
patterns do not change significantly when we narrow the analysis down to the case of 
volitional violence, the “incidents where the victim's death was clearly envisaged and 
deliberately procured.”69 However, the majority of Loyalist paramilitaries’ targets were 
volitional throughout the conflict, with the same proportions as in the case of violence 
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in general. Roughly the same holds for state forces and less so for Republican 
paramilitaries. 
Figure 2. Civilian Casualties across Armed Blocs over Time, by Victims’ Religion 
All Violence Volitional Violence 
  
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution in civilian casualties and suggests considerable 
variation across different areas, armed blocs, and ethno-religious groups. However, as 
Humphreys and Weinstein note, “it is unsatisfactory to account for variation in the 
abuse of civilians simply by saying that the CDF acted one way while the RUF acted 
another. At best, this is description not explanation.”70 The question is: what 
characteristics of armed groups and their environment made some more disposed than 
others to victimize civilians? 
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Figure 3. Civilian Casualties by Perpetrating Armed Blocs and Locations, by Victims’ 
Religion 
 
Measuring Civilian Victimization and Ideology 
We operationalize civilian victimization as lethal violence against anyone who is not 
an active belligerent. Clearly, victimization is not confined to killing but can include a 
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repertoire of violent acts and abusive behavior, from ethnic cleansing and mass 
repression to search and seizure policies and systematic harassment. We take lethal 
violence as a form of victimization that is one of the most indicative of the 
perpetrators’ ideological predispositions and which is also unambiguous. 
Our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a victim is a civilian. In civil 
wars and insurgencies it is typical that some individuals straddle the divide between 
combatant and non-combatant, for example seasonal fighters, or the so-called 
“weekend warriors.” In addition, often “non-combatant” is understood as being 
synonymous with “civilian,” yet the two concepts differ.71 In our main analysis, we 
adopt a conservative definition and code non-combatant victims as “civilian” if they 
were not former paramilitaries, alleged informers, ex-security service personnel, and 
armed group-associated politicians.72  
To test the hypothesis on the role of ideology in civilian victimization, we code two 
variables indicating whether an armed group’s ideology embraced Republicanism or 
Unionism. While specific organizations in each camp combined different ideological 
precepts, early on these two ideologies emerged as key threads connecting armed 
groups within camps. Irish Republicanism came to dominate Catholic nationalism. 
Unionist/Loyalist armed groups amalgamated the two main ideologies within the 
Protestant community, British Unionism and Ulster Loyalism, but differed in the 
emphasis they put on each.73 Given their composition and stance within the conflict, 
state forces can also be argued to have adhered to Unionism.  
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We expect that Republicanism and Unionism will be strong predictors of civilian 
victimization, controlling for other factors, and that they are likely to differ in whether 
they predisposed armed groups to the victimization of civilians in general and of 
civilians of Catholic and Protestant background in particular. We conjecture that in 
practice, from the early phase of the conflict, Republican and Unionist ideologies 
differed sharply on the emphasis they put on the subaltern status of Irish people across 
communities, inclusiveness for different communities in Northern Ireland, and non-
sectarianism. This predisposed armed groups embracing the former ideology to focus 
on targeting combatants and be restrained in violence against civilians. We explore the 
sources of these ideological differences in the later sections. 
Control Variables 
To account for the hypothesis that fighting groups are less likely to victimize civilians 
in geographic areas where they have their key bases, we construct a dichotomous 
measure of Home for each armed group.74 Co-ethnic Area indicates whether the 
constituency had majority population that was co-ethnic with a given armed group 
and accounts for the geographic dimension of cleavages. Our measure of territorial 
control – Dominance – is constructed in the same way as a measure developed by 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). It indicates the estimated size of each armed group 
relative to the estimated total size of opposing groups in each constituency.  
Size is a proxy for the capabilities and is based on the estimated average active 
membership of each group during the course of the conflict and is converted onto a 
logarithmic scale. A dichotomous measure of Experience drawn from existing 
assessments indicates whether group members on average had military experience. 
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While lootable resources that are linked to conflicts elsewhere were absent in the case 
of the Northern Ireland conflict, during its course some armed groups received 
sizeable material support from external sponsors. While the nature and size of it is 
difficult to establish, External Support indicates whether there is consistent evidence 
from across various sources that the group received such support from outside the UK. 
As in some other civil wars, groups fighting in Northern Ireland raised funds through 
organized crime. It is plausible that such behavior affected civilian victimization. Our 
measure of Crime Rents for each group is based on reported evidence of links to four 
forms of organized crime – robberies, racketeering, drug trade, and counterfeiting – by 
first building dichotomous measures for each and then combining them in a single 
variable ranging from 0 to 4. Finally, we code two dichotomous measures of internal 
characteristics of armed groups drawn from existing sources – Coherent Structure and 
Discipline.75  
Qualitative Study 
To complement our quantitative analysis and identify causal processes that potentially 
linked ideologies to the violence against civilians, we undertake a brief historical study 
of reproduction, development and effects of Republican and Unionist ideologies. 
Beyond a few solid historical studies of individual ideological traditions, there is 
paucity of systematic research on this topic, defying solid conclusions about their 
effects on the dynamics of violence in the conflict. To probe and reconstruct potential 
links, we draw on existing secondary literature, survey evidence, government 
documents, and memoirs as well as theoretical literature. Given the exploratory nature 
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of our qualitative analysis and the space limitations, we report only the findings and 
these findings are schematic and tentative, but, we hope, insightful and indicative 
nevertheless. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To test the hypotheses on civilian victimization, we estimate multivariate logistic 
regression models. First, we evaluate the relationships between each explanatory 
variable and civilian victimization after controlling for all other variables, except group 
ideology, as well as for the period and location effects (Table 1, models 1 and 4). This 
allows exploring the potential role of each factor when ideology is not accounted for, 
and comparing these patterns to those found in the existing literature. Subsequent 
models (2-3, 5-6) control for the potential effect of group ideology. We estimate 
separate models with Republicanism and Unionism because, given their strong 
correlation, estimating their effects in the same model can bias estimates and result in 
extremely large odds ratios. Since our variables are somewhat correlated given the 
relatively small number of armed groups, we are careful not to attribute much to the 
exact size of odds ratio as they may not be sufficiently reliable. Still, we look at the 
overall substantive and statistical significance of each effect in comparison to those of 
other variables. Finally, to examine whether different group ideologies are associated 
with victimizing civilians of different ethno-religious backgrounds, we estimate 
separate models with dependent variables that indicate the civilian victims’ belonging 
to different ethno-religious groups (Table 2).  
  
  
Table 1. Multivariate Results with Clustering by Year, All Civilians 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Type of Violence: All All All Volitional Volitional Volitional 
Dependent Variable: Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian 
Allegiances       
Home 0.540 0.529 0.519 0.407 0.390 0.387 
 (0.230) (0.225) (0.222) (0.236) (0.233) (0.232) 
Cleavages       
Co-ethnic Area 0.476*** 0.458*** 0.455*** 0.434*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.136) (0.131) (0.131) 
Control       
Dominance 1.027 1.028 1.030 1.057 1.060 1.060 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Capabilities       
Size 1.173 0.547*** 0.812 1.358 0.585*** 0.942 
 (0.207) (0.116) (0.139) (0.302) (0.115) (0.136) 
Experience 3.270*** 0.803 0.849 4.025* 0.729 1.167 
 (1.469) (0.545) (0.416) (2.992) (0.368) (0.476) 
Resources       
External Support 13.603*** 6.396 2.705 9.119** 1.484 1.118 
 (10.634) (7.900) (2.819) (8.223) (1.078) (0.733) 
Crime Rents 0.463** 0.709 0.566 0.603 1.588 0.870 
 (0.173) (0.437) (0.267) (0.252) (0.590) (0.250) 
Organization       
Coherent Structure 0.563 0.575 0.587 0.814 1.394 1.015 
 (0.252) (0.384) (0.327) (0.428) (0.513) (0.339) 
Discipline 0.056*** 1.180 0.865 0.030*** 1.412 0.638 
 (0.016) (0.874) (0.398) (0.012) (0.904) (0.302) 
Ideology       
Republicanism  0.069***   0.032***  
  (0.053)   (0.021)  
Unionism   13.588***   18.709*** 
   (7.003)   (9.278) 
Constant 3.201 927.119*** 25.599* 0.258 57.889*** 1.110 
 (5.367) (2,055.438) (48.797) (0.467) (80.745) (1.243) 
Observations 3,340 3,340 3,340 2,951 2,951 2,951 
% Correctly Predicted 71.19 71.17 71.19 77.11 77.14 77.14 
Area under ROC Curve 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for 
clustering by year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
In both sets of specifications in Table 1 and 2, we estimate models for all violence and 
separately for volitional violence for a more fine-grained analysis. In all models, we 
weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group. To account for 
waves of violence, we allow for the possibility of correlation across killings in a given 
year.76 Our models exhibit good fit: the percent correctly predicted stays mostly well 
                                                     
76
 In the case of Northern Ireland conflict the latter is more applicable as victimization was more likely 
to be clustered in time than space, possibly due to the relatively small size of the country and the 
  
above 70 and areas under the ROC curve fall either between 0.70-0.80, exhibiting fair 
fit, or 0.80-0.90, showing good fit.77 
Consistent with our expectations, we find a substantively and statistically strong 
relationship between group ideology and civilian victimization. Republicanism is 
associated with a smaller likelihood of civilian victimization, compared to the other 
two armed blocs. Unionism, on the other hand, is associated with larger odds of 
civilian victimization, controlling for other factors, compared to Republican groups 
and the state forces. The relationship between group ideology and civilian 
victimization emerges, along with Co-ethnic Area, as the only consistently strong 
relationship. These differences are starker when we consider only volitional violence.  
When we disaggregate civilians by religious background (Table 2), we find evidence of 
proneness to cross-ethnic targeting on both sides. Having a Republican ideology 
significantly increases the odds of victimizing a Protestant civilian, and reduces the 
group’s odds of victimizing a Catholic civilian. Conversely, if a victimized civilian was a 
Catholic, the odds that the perpetrator armed group had a Unionist ideology increase 
significantly. At the same time, Unionist groups were not more or less likely to 
victimize Protestant civilians. These differences are more pronounced when we 
consider only volitional violence. Overall, the comparison of the size of odds ratios for 
Unionism and Republicanism – for example, 2.839 in Model 2 and 12.745 in Model 3 – 
suggests that Unionist groups were more disposed to cross-ethnic civilian targeting.  
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Table 2. Multivariate Results with Clustering by Year, Civilians by Religion 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Type of Violence:   All All All All Volitional Volitional Volitional Volitional 
Dependent Variable: Catholic 
Civilian 
Protestant 
Civilian 
Catholic 
Civilian 
Protestant 
Civilian 
Catholic 
Civilian 
Protestant 
Civilian 
Catholic 
Civilian 
Protestant 
Civilian 
Allegiances         
Home 0.869 0.803 0.853 0.808 0.491 1.002 0.485 1.005 
 (0.366) (0.453) (0.362) (0.457) (0.307) (0.704) (0.306) (0.705) 
Cleavages         
Co-ethnic Area 0.621* 1.693 0.620* 1.680 0.658 1.524 0.659 1.518 
 (0.151) (0.678) (0.151) (0.672) (0.174) (0.634) (0.174) (0.631) 
Control         
Dominance 0.988 1.030 0.989 1.029 1.021 1.029 1.021 1.028 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045) (0.052) 
Capabilities         
Size 0.784 0.731* 1.206 0.600*** 0.736* 0.808 1.178 0.681** 
 (0.117) (0.129) (0.138) (0.106) (0.123) (0.147) (0.150) (0.126) 
Experience 1.295 0.907 1.455 0.884 1.714 0.871 2.396** 0.810 
 (0.530) (0.488) (0.570) (0.545) (0.708) (0.511) (1.046) (0.497) 
Resources         
External Support 6.814** 0.891 2.917 1.092 5.213** 0.484 3.446 0.543 
 (5.624) (0.772) (2.173) (1.068) (4.180) (0.423) (3.035) (0.507) 
Crime Rents 0.582 1.024 0.467*** 1.118 0.748 1.356 0.430** 1.599 
 (0.205) (0.375) (0.130) (0.450) (0.290) (0.529) (0.161) (0.608) 
Organization         
Coherent 
Structure 
0.489* 1.046 0.508** 1.018 0.565 1.738 0.429** 1.854 
 (0.194) (0.445) (0.166) (0.494) (0.227) (0.716) (0.181) (0.788) 
Discipline 0.556 1.657 0.352*** 2.494** 0.589 1.180 0.287** 1.630 
 (0.238) (0.699) (0.131) (0.951) (0.312) (0.463) (0.143) (0.626) 
Ideology         
Republicanism 0.064*** 2.839**   0.033*** 3.000**   
 (0.029) (1.393)   (0.018) (1.467)   
Unionism   12.745*** 0.476   19.431*** 0.418* 
   (5.079) (0.221)   (9.885) (0.191) 
Constant 24.694** 1.107 0.518 5.286 7.964* 0.158 0.166* 0.596 
 (36.479) (1.403) (0.569) (7.121) (9.032) (0.254) (0.172) (0.984) 
Observations 3,225 3,204 3,225 3,204 2,892 2,871 2,892 2,871 
% Correctly 
Predicted 
87.08 81.09 87.08 81.09 90.70 83.60 90.70 83.60 
Area under ROC 
Curve 
0.84 0.70 0.84 0.70 0.91 0.70 0.91 0.70 
Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard errors 
in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for clustering by 
year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 
levels, respectively. 
 
The results also help cast light on the role of other factors, all of which, except Co-
Ethnic Area, find little or mixed empirical support. When ideology is not accounted 
for, we find that Experience, External Support, Discipline, and Crime Rents are 
associated with victimizing a civilian, albeit not always in hypothesized ways. These 
effects find little support once we include ideology as a factor. However, we find 
consistently strong empirical support for the hypothesis that fighting groups were less 
  
likely to victimize civilians in geographic areas where they had more co-ethnics among 
the members of the local community. When civilians are disaggregated by their ethno-
religious background, the effect of Co-ethnic Area is no longer statistically significant. 
There is also some indication that larger groups were less likely to kill civilians. We do 
not find any support in our data for the role of other factors.  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
One of the key concerns may be that our results on the importance of ideology depend 
on the measurement of the dependent variable. Specifically, while RUC and UDR 
members were combatants, it is possible that their targeting by Republican 
paramilitaries had to do not (only) with their status as security force members, but, 
given the predominantly Protestant composition of these forces (around 93 per cent in 
the case of the RUC), with the ethnic identity of most of them.78 We address this 
concern by re-estimating our core model with dependent variables Civilian2 and 
Protestant Civilian2, which regard victims who were serving in RUC and UDR as 
civilians.  
The main results survive this test well (Table 3). In the case of general civilian 
victimization (columns 1-2), the odds ratios somewhat increase for Republicanism and 
decrease for Unionism, but otherwise the results are essentially unchanged. In the case 
of Protestant civilian victimization (columns 3-4), two changes take place. First, while 
odds ratio for Republicanism increases significantly, it stays below Unionism in the case 
of victimizing Catholic civilians (i.e., 5.577 in Table 3, column 3 vs. 12.745 in Table 2, 
column 3). Second, the odds ratio for Unionism is significantly below 1 and is 
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statistically significant, suggesting that Unionist groups were significantly less likely to 
target RUC and UDR. 
Since the state forces consisted of predominantly Protestant personnel and were 
significantly less violent as the conflict developed, coding only the paramilitaries as 
carriers of ideology can create an upward bias, making Unionism seem more associated 
with civilian victimization. To rectify this, we replicate the main results with 
Unionism2 which includes the state forces as carriers of Unionist ideology (column 5). 
The results change in the opposite direction than hypothesized – the odds of 
victimizing civilians when the group is Unionist actually increase.  
Next we examine whether the effect of ideology on patterns of targeting changed after 
the introduction of Ulsterization, "normalization" and "criminalization" policies in 1975 
(columns 6-7). Indeed, the results change, but partially, and the direction of effects 
stays the same.  
The results also remain largely unchanged79 when we re-estimate the baseline model 
after controlling for the degree of parity80  between Catholic and Protestant 
populations (columns 1-2); focus only on Northern Ireland regions (the “murder 
triangle”) where Kalyvas  has  claimed that a large number of killings were motivated 
by personal animosities81 (columns 3-4); conceptualize the dependent variable in 
broader Noncombatant terms that includes former paramilitaries, alleged informers, 
politicians and ex-security service persons as well as civilians (columns 5-6); focus on 
civilians killed in attacks where sectarian motives could be reasonably established82 
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(columns 7-8); adopt alternative periodization based on exact dates (columns 9-10); 
substitute Home with a variable Home2 constructed to reflect electoral support to 
Unionist and Nationalist parties in the 1970 Westminister elections (columns 11-12); 
and substitute Home with a variable Home3, where none of the constituencies in 
Northern Ireland are coded as a home for BA, RUC, and UDR (columns 13-14). 
Table 3. Robustness Checks 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Type of Violence: All All All All All All All 
Dependent Variable: Civilian2 Civilian2 
Protestant 
Civilian2 
Protestant 
Civilian2 Civilian Civilian Civilian 
Allegiances        
Home 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.449** 0.455** 0.529 0.450 0.449 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.157) (0.158) (0.225) (0.250) (0.249) 
Cleavages        
Co-ethnic Area 0.537*** 0.535*** 2.770** 2.760** 0.458*** 0.638 0.637 
 (0.117) (0.117) (1.126) (1.120) (0.105) (0.236) (0.235) 
Control        
Dominance 1.053* 1.054* 1.030 1.029 1.028 1.050 1.050 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.040) (0.040) 
Capabilities        
Size 0.546*** 0.761* 0.795 0.588*** 0.547*** 0.643** 0.760 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.117) (0.069) (0.116) (0.129) (0.140) 
Experience 0.476 0.500 0.490 0.471 0.803 2.216** 2.079** 
 (0.301) (0.235) (0.224) (0.247) (0.545) (0.837) (0.759) 
Resources        
External Support 6.314* 3.091 0.710 1.116 6.396 19.406*** 11.244** 
 (6.968) (3.100) (0.630) (1.053) (7.900) (18.864) (10.694) 
Crime Rents 1.104 0.903 1.592 1.813* 0.709 0.393** 0.380** 
 (0.574) (0.371) (0.491) (0.623) (0.437) (0.182) (0.171) 
Organization        
Coherent 
Structure 
0.607 0.610 1.080 1.029 0.575 0.401 0.429 
 (0.361) (0.323) (0.450) (0.462) (0.384) (0.229) (0.240) 
Discipline 2.629 2.027 4.248*** 6.880*** 1.180 0.327*** 0.326*** 
 (1.952) (0.987) (1.749) (2.510) (0.874) (0.135) (0.123) 
Ideology        
Republicanism 0.103***  5.577***   0.328***  
 (0.082)  (2.922)   (0.117)  
Unionism  9.215***  0.244***   3.364*** 
  (5.144)  (0.123)   (1.129) 
Unionism2     14.505***   
     (11.102)   
Constant 157.762** 7.731 0.100* 1.252 63.919** 77.104** 15.428 
 (313.149) (12.551) (0.122) (1.284) (132.795) (161.565) (28.975) 
Observations 3,340 3,340 3,225 3,225 3,340 1,939 1,939 
% Correctly 
Predicted 
65.72 65.71 68.21 68.21 71.17 72.51 72.51 
Area under ROC 
Curve 
0.68 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76  0.76 
Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for 
clustering by year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
  
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY 
Irish Republicanism and Unionism ostensibly have many commonalities, with a 
spectrum of subsets of radical, moderate, secular and religious elements within each. 
Both emerged in the early modern period of European history, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, during struggles over the nature of the state and government 
characterized by the shift from monarchical to more limited or republican forms of 
government. Both also make fundamental claims that the principles of religious and 
civil liberties for all are sacrosanct.  The fundamental ideological claims mirror the 
other and appear inclusive. However, if they are similar, how can we account for their 
different associations with the violence against civilians? We trace these differences to 
the interplay between three factors informed by the ideological commitments in 
practice – path dependency in norms, recruitment patterns, and alliance with the state. 
Path-Dependent Norms  
While emerging in the same context, the positions of Republicanism and Unionism in 
the context of struggle between indigenous and settler-colonist peoples entailed a 
number of differences. Rooted in the civic ideology of the French Revolution, and 
founded by mainly Protestant elite members, Republicanism also subsumed the 
elements of nineteenth century nationalism. It emphasized the subaltern status of all 
Irish people, thus stressing inclusiveness of different communities in Ireland and with 
its anti-colonialist strand focused its energies against imperial control. These tenets 
entailed disinclination towards violence against members of the community that 
would make the imagined community of free Ireland. From their crystallization under 
the Fenian Movement and the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the mid-nineteenth 
  
century, these norms can be tracked during the Irish War of Independence.83 
Regarding themselves heirs to the previous Republican activists, pursuing similar 
goals, and recruiting from a similar pool of recruits, Republican armed groups during 
1970s were likely to be constrained by a path-dependent institutional culture of 
focusing on combatants who represented the imperial power and by an ethos of non-
sectarianism.84  Republican paramilitary leaders also had to take into account the views 
of their key constituency, which was averse to the use of violence for political ends at 
the start of the conflict. In a 1968 survey, only 13 percent of Catholic respondents 
agreed with a statement that it “would be right to take any measures necessary in order 
to end partition and bring Ulster into the Republic.”85 
With roots in the Orange Order, Loyalism and Unionism emerged as anti-Catholic 
colonist ideologies in seventeenth century Ireland.86 They crystallized defensive 
attitudes that characterized settler identity among Protestant communities in the 
northern plantations of Ireland. Subsequently, they became founding principles for the 
partition of Ireland in 1921 and the creation of a new province of Northern Ireland 
within the UK.87 Having inherited these beliefs, Loyalist paramilitary ideological 
discourse from 1960s on emphasized that “Ulster Loyalists live in a state of eternal 
siege” and that Northern Ireland Protestants regard Catholics as an ideological foe - 
“uncommitted citizens, intent on the destruction of Northern Ireland.”88 In the same 
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1968 survey,89 51 percent of Protestant respondents agreed with the statement that it 
“would be right to take any measures necessary in order to keep Northern Ireland a 
Protestant country.” Against this background, it is likely that the Loyalist 
paramilitaries felt less restrained than Republicans in their targeting strategy. 
Recruitment Patterns 
The cornerstone of the Unionist ideology – defending the Union with Britain – allowed 
its supporters to join not only the paramilitaries but also the local state forces. This 
possibly resulted in qualitatively different groups of recruits. Bruce argues that Loyalist 
paramilitaries recruited from a less competent pool than Republicans because capable 
Protestants joined the local RUC and UDR forces.90 However, it may not have been - or 
may not have been only – the question of competence: our statistical analysis shows 
that the experience of members does not explain armed groups’ targeting patterns 
once ideology is accounted for. Building on Bruce’s reasoning as well as our evidence, 
it seems more likely that Loyalist paramilitary groups attracted recruits who were more 
radical and sectarian in their ideological stances.  
The specific type of recruitment and socialization many Republican recruits ended up 
undergoing also probably had a profound impact on their targeting patterns. Given its 
treatment of the Republican movement as an insurgency, the British state applied 
internment without trial selectively: during the use of internment from August 1971 
until December 1975, out of 1,981 people detained 1,874 were Catholic/Republican.91 In 
its publications in the early 1970s, PIRA concentrated its ideological socialization effort 
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on two major elements: non-sectarianism and appealing to the key role of Irish 
Protestants in the United Irishmen (the foundational movement of Irish 
Republicanism), and armed struggle against British colonialism.92 The principles of 
inclusiveness were deliberated upon, developed and passed through the Republican 
networks created by internment. Thus, ironically, the policy of internment facilitated 
the process of socialization and ideological indoctrination for PIRA and other 
Republicans, the specific mode of which enabled the latter to contain civilian 
victimization. In contrast, moderating Loyalist leaders, such as the iconic leaders of 
UVF and UDA Gusty Spence and John McMichael, did not have the opportunity 
provided by the internment policy to reorient their groups in a more restrained and 
less sectarian ideological direction.  
State Collusion 
When ideological projects of the state and a paramilitary group overlap, collusion 
between them is a likely outcome.93 The affinity of Unionism with the ideological 
project and political stance of the British state - favoring the Union and viewing 
Republicans as the adversary – implied a natural alliance. By now, there is a rich body 
of evidence that testifies to a deep collusion that emerged between Loyalist 
paramilitary groups and the state security forces from early 1970s. The Nelson Case 
(1992) and others revealed that leading Loyalist paramilitaries were working 
undercover as state agents. According to official UK government enquiries, key 
security institutions in the state, in particular RUC Special Branch and the section of 
British Military Intelligence known as the Force Research Unit or Field Reconnaissance 
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Unit (FRU) systematically colluded with the main Loyalist armed group (UDA), 
providing it with secret intelligence information about Republican activists, using the 
state undercover agents to manage targeting, and had a “culture” of illegality.94 A UK 
Security Service report of 1985 assessed that 85% of the UDA’s ‘intelligence’ originated 
from sources within the security forces.95  RUC and UDR members were active within 
Loyalist paramilitary units that conducted sectarian killings from early 1970s.96  
It may be puzzling that despite having necessary information and opportunity to be 
more selective, and having guidance from competent employees of state security 
institutions, Loyalist paramilitaries were not restrained in their violence against 
civilians. However, the support from the state forces as well as the initial superiority of 
Unionism’s political position in Northern Ireland may have fostered a lack of restraint 
among Loyalist paramilitary elites and recruits and failed to incentivize the 
refashioning of their ideology in a non-sectarian direction. Their development of 
politically astute non-sectarian strategies was weak, instead making their groups more 
porous for infiltration by ultra-radicals. 
Given the systematic nature of this collusion and the fact that states often contract out 
violence against civilians to militias,97 could civilian victimization by Loyalist armed 
groups also be a result of strategic outsourcing of violence by elements within the state 
to pro-government militias to achieve ideological and political ends?  Modern military 
theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency see the local populations as pivotal 
elements in a strategic game between belligerents, and their allegiance or compliance 
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are seen by some as usually determined by force.98 The “outsourcing” of civilian 
victimization to Loyalist groups could be seen as the state’s attempt to raise the costs 
of Catholics’ support for insurgency and to achieve allegiance or compliance. There 
remains a paucity of systematic evidence, and these are ultimately questions for future 
research. 
Alternative Explanation: Political and strategic choices, not ideology  
It might be objected that civilian victimization in the Northern Ireland conflict 
reflected the strategic choices of warring factions, not their ideologies. The thesis holds 
that civilian victimization aims to either raise the costs to civilians of supporting an 
armed group or to pressure the enemy into concessions by victimizing its population 
base. Bruce and Fay argue that Loyalist targeting of Catholics fits this “strategic logic” 
of counterinsurgency - pressuring Republicans by victimizing Catholic civilians.99 
Stanton sees restraint, too, in instrumental rather than ideological terms: governments 
or insurgents avoid targeting civilians to win domestic or international support by 
demonstrating respect for international humanitarian law.100 Despite its omission – 
domestic or international support can be secured by governments and paramilitaries 
from sources that do not care for international humanitarian law101 – it can be argued 
that the armed groups were more or less restrained mainly for instrumental reasons. 
The evidence we have does not support this view. First, with the amount of 
information available to Loyalists through state collusion, it would have been more 
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logical to target Republican paramilitaries directly. Second, Republican paramilitaries 
targeted mostly combatants despite the facts that these were high risk, costly activities 
– at the minimum, the combatant targets can be armed (even when off-duty) and 
trained and, therefore, easily reciprocate by violence. If they were operating within the 
strategic calculus outlined above, then Republican paramilitaries should have targeted 
mostly civilians, as they were much easier targets and that could have been a tangible 
strategic way of pressuring Unionists and the British government. Republicans were 
denounced by the British state and Unionists as terrorists in any event, and they 
received support from different international sources, so theoretically they had little to 
lose in the propaganda war, except in so far as such tactics would be self-undermining 
from their own ideological position.  
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this article, we have theorized and empirically examined the role of group ideology 
in explaining patterns of civilian victimization across belligerents. Employing an 
original micro-level dataset that allows sub-national and armed group-level statistical 
analysis, we found that the ideologies of armed groups in Northern Ireland’s civil war 
consistently predicted their targeting patterns, in line with some previous qualitative 
accounts on armed blocs or specific paramilitary organizations.102 These results survive 
a battery of robustness checks. We offer preliminary evidence that suggests that the 
path dependencies in norms, the recruitment patterns, and the relations with the state 
forces can explain why group ideology was associated with targeting patterns.  
Furthermore, our results lend empirical support to our conjecture that, in some cases, 
other organizational characteristics – such as capability, external support, and 
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discipline – may be endogenous to the warring factions’ ideologies. While we do not 
claim that this travels across all cases of civil wars, we do take it as an important signal 
that ideology should be treated much more seriously than it has been in mainstream 
civil war literature in political science and economics. Ignoring group ideology or 
downplaying its role risks creating a dangerously incomplete or skewed account.  
Naturally, our findings may have limitations. First, based on our logic that killings are 
probably the most critical indicators of victimization as well as following Downes and 
Balcells, we operationalized civilian victimization in terms of fatalities.103 Our model 
may not explain – or at least not as well – situations where the repertoire of 
victimization includes a wider array of violent acts, although, all else being equal, we 
do not see why ideology should not matter in such instances. Second, like Humphreys 
and Weinstein,104 we examined our hypotheses based on evidence from one civil war, 
which may have had features that made ideology a prominent factor in civilian 
victimization, such as the fact that the conflict we study took place in a developed 
industrialized democracy and exhibited typical characteristics of ethnic civil wars. 
These features of the Northern Ireland conflict possibly may limit the realm within 
which our story on the role of ideology holds. Finally, our location variables are 
measured on constituency rather than a lower level, such as wards. Unfortunately, 
such fine-grained systematic data that stretch back to the beginning of the Northern 
Ireland conflict is very difficult to assemble, especially given several sub-national 
boundary changes that took place during the conflict.105  
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Nevertheless, the gist of this article’s findings implies significant re-conceptualization 
is required in the efforts to understand and resolve civil wars and we suggest important 
avenues for future research. First, we suggest that prevention of civilian victimization 
requires a closer look at ideological frameworks of warring factions in a civil war. The 
impact of ideology on civilian victimization can be part of a broader, global pattern. If 
ideologies can spread through diffusion, their effect on violence against civilians may 
also travel across borders. This is all the more critical because the globalization of 
technology and information flows can enhance the diffusion of ideologies, regardless of 
their normative stances, as demonstrated by the Islamic State’s astute propaganda 
machine. While the principles displayed by Kurdish forces in Syria can serve as a 
blueprint for some armed groups in other conflicts, Isil’s al-Qaeda-inspired approach, 
including the principles it has displayed in Deir Al Zor and elsewhere, can undoubtedly 
further inspire and be emulated by others. Second, the repertoire of violence used may 
be a strong factor in the post-conflict political legitimacy of belligerents. Sinn Féin has 
had electoral success, whereas Loyalist paramilitary efforts to engage in democratic 
politics have been very modest. This suggests that belligerents’ ideologies and the 
practice of civilian victimization can undermine the legitimacy required to make the 
transition to party politics after conflict ends.   
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NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AS A CASE OF CIVIL WAR  
One might wonder whether the Northern Ireland conflict constituted a civil war. If we 
were to use the earlier Correlates of War (COW) Project106 threshold of 1,000 conflict-
related deaths per year, it certainly wasn’t: the total fatality count for the whole 
conflict reached 3,702, but its most violent year, 1972, saw 502 fatalities, according to 
our estimates. However, a number of studies have demonstrated the disadvantages of 
using this threshold in coding different types of conflict.107 Later versions of the COW 
project no longer use it, instead requiring wars to have resulted in at least 1,000 deaths. 
Several studies have included Northern Ireland as a case of civil war despite varying 
criteria. Some see it as an ambiguous case.108 It falls within the joint Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program and International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO) program 
criteria for civil wars.109 Kalyvas does not use a casualty threshold at all and 
conceptualizes a civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the 
hostilities.”110  Taking these accounts together, we maintain that what Northern Ireland 
experienced in 1969-2005 was in fact a civil war.  
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MERGING DATASETS ON FATALITIES 
For the analysis in this paper, three sources of data were merged - McKeown (2009), 
Sutton (2001), and McKittrick et al. (2001). The first two are publicly available online. 
The first one is an well-structured existing dataset in Excel format. It was used for 
coding most variables. The second reports fatalities in chronological order online with 
short textual information about each. Its unique strength is that it provides the exact 
date of death. The third source is an extensive book containing detailed descriptive 
information on most fatalities, and is arguably the most reliable of the three. We drew 
on existing variables in the first, and used the second and third sources for three 
purposes: complement the first in terms of observations, help with inconsistencies 
across the sources, and code new variables, such as employment status and 
occupation, which are not contained in McKeown (2009) and Sutton (2001).  
While their many observations overlap, some observations are unique to each source. 
During the course of merger, we also discovered a number of inconsistencies across 
the three sources. These concern mostly names, gender, dates (years), victim’s status, 
specific organization responsible, motivation, etc. When one of the sources reported a 
data point that contradicted those in the other two sources, we relied on the latter for 
(re)coding a value. If all three differed, we preferred McKittrick et al. 2001. In some 
cases (around a hundred), other online sources, particularly newspaper articles, were 
consulted for clarification.  
Some problems were more consequential than others. For example, McKeown (2009) 
reports Robert Bates (Protestant male, killed in 1997 by non-specified loyalist group) as 
a non-combatant. However, this is disputable because, despite the fact that he was 
killed shortly after leaving prison, Robert Bates was one of the notorious members of 
  
the infamous “Shankill Butchers” gang, responsible for a number of abductions of 
innocent Catholic civilians, their subsequent brutal torture and killing. Another case is 
for instance the coding of gender: around 10 percent of victims coded as female (n=372) 
in McKeown (2009) were in fact males. 
One of the key drawbacks in McKeown dataset that was also solved using McKittrick et 
al. data is a large number of fatalities with insufficiently specified responsible group. In 
the case of non-specified republican killings, there are 109 such observations; for non-
specified loyalist killings, 364. Using McKittrick et al. (2001), Sutton (2001) and other 
sources, we were able to bring these numbers down to 35 and 33, respectively.  
McKittrick et al. (2001) was also used to code two new employment-related variables 
for victims - employment (n=3710, with 1210 unknown values) and occupation (n=3710, 
with 1387 unknown values). 
  
  
VARIABLES AND SOURCES 
After the merger of the three sources on fatalities, we coded details on fifteen 
organizations responsible for killings during the conflict (the second component of our 
dataset) and on eighteen Northern Ireland parliamentary constituencies (the third 
component). The second component contains group-level variables, including the 
organization’s base territories, capabilities, external resources, structure, and ideology. 
The third component includes constituency-level population size, religious 
breakdown, electoral support for Unionist and Nationalist parties, and military 
presence that date back to 1969 and are coded from a variety of census and electoral 
data. The values for variables were derived and triangulated from a variety of sources. 
As the number and borders of sub-national constituencies in Northern Ireland have 
changed over time, we took great care in converting evidence by utilizing information 
and maps of wards, local government districts, and parliamentary constituencies. To 
account for the hypothesis that fighting groups are less likely to victimize civilians in 
geographic areas where they have their key bases, we construct a dichotomous 
measure of Home for each armed group. For Loyalist and Republican paramilitary 
groups it takes the value of 1 if the killing was carried out in a constituency from which 
they originated and where they had their strongholds. The same does not apply for 
state forces, however, because for the latter having more bases in a particular area is 
likely to indicate the opposite: in Northern Ireland, they were likely to be more present 
in areas where they lacked support (Republican areas), and less present in areas where 
they had more support. To construct this measure for state forces, we draw their 
deployment data – location and number of barracks, stations, and camps. For the 
British Army, Home takes the value of 0 except for Great Britain and for Northern 
Ireland constituencies of East Antrim and Strangford where there were no BA or 
  
UDR/RIR barracks, which we take to indicate as no need for BA/RIR presence and 
hence higher support for them (both were predominantly Protestant constituencies in 
1971 – 77.6% and 88.3%, respectively). We code this variable as 0 in the case of UDR if 
the location has at least one BA or UDR/RIR barrack, and 1 if otherwise. We code 1 for 
RUC if there were less than five RUC (police) stations in a constituency,111 which we 
take to indicate smaller need and higher support for RUC.  
To account for the geographic dimension of cleavages, we construct a dichotomous 
measure of Co-ethnic Area for each armed group in each constituency. It takes the 
value of 1 if the constituency’s population was at least 60 percent of the ethno-religious 
identity of the fighting group in 1971 and 0 if otherwise. Given the predominantly 
Protestant composition of state forces, for them we code Co-ethnic Area as 1 if the 
constituency is 60+ percent Protestant and 0 if otherwise.  
To account for territorial control, we construct a measure of Dominance that is similar 
to the one developed by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). It indicates the estimated 
size of each armed group relative to the estimated total size of opposing groups in each 
constituency. We first estimated the average size of each armed group in each of the 18 
constituencies. For the paramilitary groups, we divided each group’s total average size 
by the number of its base territories and then placed the resulting quotient in each 
constituency where the paramilitary group had a base. For the state forces – BA, 
UDR/RIR and RUC – we estimated their average sizes in each of the 18 locations by 
dividing their total average size by the total number of barracks and multiplying the 
number of barracks in each of the 18 locations by the resulting average barrack size 
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(e.g., 57 in the case of RUC). Next, we summed up the estimated size of each armed 
camp in each constituency. Finally, we divided the estimated size of each armed group 
in each constituency by the estimated summed sizes of opposing camps and converted 
the results onto a logarithmic scale to avoid skew. For locations outside Northern 
Ireland, all dominance measures were set to zero except for the British Army in Great 
Britain. 
To proxy for the capabilities, Size is based on the estimated average active membership 
of each group during the course of the conflict and is converted onto a logarithmic 
scale. The second aspect of armed groups’ capability concerns their recruits’ level of 
military experience, which can affect targeting patterns. In the absence of systematic 
data on this, we draw a dichotomous measure of Experience from existing assessments 
to indicate whether group members on average had military experience. 
While lootable resources that are linked to conflicts elsewhere were absent in the case 
of the Northern Ireland conflict, during its course some armed groups received 
sizeable material support from external sponsors. The Provisional IRA reportedly 
received assistance from the Republic of Ireland, Libya, Iran, Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and diaspora groups in the United States. The Official IRA 
allegedly secured help from USSR, North Korea, and East Germany. Loyalist groups, 
such as UDA and UVF, also obtained material resources from outside, most notably 
from Canada and South Africa as well as from Scotland and allegedly through 
colluding with, infiltrating and being infiltrated by state forces.112 The nature and size 
of such support is difficult to establish consistently. External Support for each armed 
group indicates whether there is evidence from across various sources that the group 
has received such support. Since all groups received support from outside Northern 
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Ireland in one way or another and, therefore, estimating a model with a dichotomous 
variable on this that lacks variation will not be useful, here we focus on external 
support from outside the UK. 
As in some other civil wars, groups fighting in Northern Ireland raised funds through 
another form of securing external resources – organized crime. It is plausible that such 
behavior affected civilian victimization. Our measure of Crime Rents for each group is 
based on reported evidence of links to four forms of organized crime – robberies, 
racketeering, drug trade, and counterfeiting – by first building dichotomous measures 
for each and then combining them in a single variable ranging from 0 to 4.  
We code two dichotomous measures of internal characteristics of armed groups – 
Coherent Structure and Discipline. There was significant variation among different 
groups in this regard. While some groups like the Republican INLA or Loyalist RHC 
had loose organizational structures and weak discipline, others, such as the Provisional 
IRA became tightly organized a few years into the conflict, and by 1975, into a highly 
effective cellular structure and had strong intra-organizational policing (Operation 
Banner 2006). 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Civilian 3361 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Civilian2 3361 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Catholic Civilian 3361 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Protestant Civilian 3361 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Protestant Civilian2 3361 0.31 0.49 0 1 
 
     
Independent Variables      
Allegiance      
Home 3361 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Cleavages      
Co-ethnic Area 3361 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Control      
Dominance 3361 7.49 7.28 0 23 
Capabilities      
Size  3340 6.76 1.26 1.94 9.61 
Experience 3340 0.96 0.19 0 1 
Resources      
External Support 3340 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Crime Rents 3340 2.76 1.07 0 4 
Organization      
Coherent Structure 3340 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Discipline 3340 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Ideology      
Republicanism 3340 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Unionism 3340 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Unionism2 3340 0.41 0.49 0 1 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 2 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Type of Violence: All All All All All All All All 
Dependent Variable: Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Noncombatant Noncombatant Civilian sectarian Civilian sectarian 
Home 0.548 0.559 0.461 0.461 0.488* 0.496* 0.062 0.133 
 (0.257) (0.261) (0.330) (0.329) (0.208) (0.210) (0.200) (0.353) 
Co-ethnic Area 0.473*** 0.475*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.496*** 0.498*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.137) (0.136) (0.111) (0.111) (0.082) (0.082) 
Dominance 1.025 1.024 0.997 0.997 1.031 1.031 1.212 1.147 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.046) (0.045) (0.031) (0.031) (0.278) (0.215) 
Size 0.809 0.549*** 1.260 0.726 0.828 0.572*** 0.286 0.111** 
 (0.148) (0.123) (0.329) (0.236) (0.136) (0.122) (0.261) (0.116) 
Experience 0.835 0.823 0.249* 0.128** 0.816 0.752 1.887 2.740 
 (0.489) (0.598) (0.205) (0.120) (0.342) (0.431) (2.241) (4.048) 
External Support 2.367 5.885 0.299 0.360 3.420 7.329** 1.287 4.216 
 (2.745) (7.583) (0.434) (0.530) (2.882) (7.297) (1.725) (6.835) 
Crime Rents 0.576 0.705 1.543 3.270* 0.595 0.742 2.236 4.133* 
 (0.296) (0.454) (0.874) (2.125) (0.227) (0.371) (1.131) (3.293) 
Coherent Structure 0.556 0.535 1.111 1.698 0.501 0.496 1.110 1.165 
 (0.335) (0.371) (0.727) (1.241) (0.232) (0.273) (0.654) (1.019) 
Discipline 0.943 1.216 1.582 4.298 0.898 1.244 8.762 41.733 
 (0.538) (0.984) (0.965) (3.938) (0.387) (0.837) (16.822) (98.195) 
Unionism 13.671***  27.574***  10.912***  312.110***  
 (8.364)  (23.393)  (5.453)  (431.168)  
Republicanism  0.072***  0.018***  0.083***  0.001*** 
  (0.059)  (0.020)  (0.059)  (0.002) 
Parity 0.042** 0.042**       
 (0.062) (0.061)       
Constant 49.235* 1,711.904*** 0.696 65.839* 20.227* 572.838*** 1.870 6,632.215* 
 (104.665) (4,129.230) (1.367) (150.711) (35.053) (1,196.857) (5.418) (31,469.037) 
Observations 3,103 3,103 1,285 1,285 3,340 3,340 90.35 90.35 
% Correctly Predicted 70.97 70.93 72.73 72.78 67.33 67.33 0.88 0.88 
Area under ROC Curve 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.76 
  
Table 2 (continued)  
Model: 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Type of Violence: All All All All All All 
Dependent Variable: Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian 
Home 0.538 0.548     
 (0.228) (0.231)     
Home2   1.246 1.250   
   (0.221) (0.220)   
Home3     0.508 0.518 
     (0.223) (0.226) 
Co-ethnic Area 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.386*** 0.387*** 0.455*** 0.458*** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.077) (0.077) (0.105) (0.105) 
Dominance 1.024 1.023 0.988 0.989 1.031 1.030 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.031) 
Size 0.896 0.594*** 0.937 0.642** 0.805 0.540*** 
 (0.118) (0.106) (0.144) (0.127) (0.139) (0.115) 
Experience 0.813 0.710 0.943 0.879 0.874 0.823 
 (0.362) (0.446) (0.411) (0.534) (0.421) (0.554) 
External Support 1.769 3.795 2.276 5.040 2.735 6.497 
 (1.602) (3.953) (2.285) (5.966) (2.837) (8.005) 
Crime Rents 0.702 0.924 0.520 0.651 0.563 0.708 
 (0.260) (0.464) (0.230) (0.375) (0.263) (0.435) 
Coherent Structure 0.713 0.728 0.597 0.589 0.581 0.569 
 (0.326) (0.396) (0.321) (0.376) (0.322) (0.378) 
Discipline 0.805 1.219 0.668 0.919 0.887 1.219 
 (0.343) (0.858) (0.263) (0.614) (0.412) (0.908) 
Unionism 13.561***  11.588***  13.863***  
 (6.479)  (5.607)  (7.143)  
Republicanism  0.063***  0.079***  0.067*** 
  (0.045)  (0.056)  (0.052) 
Constant 9.666* 381.784*** 16.898 509.422*** 26.149* 983.256*** 
 (12.888) (617.064) (31.409) (1,103.918) (49.571) (2,173.882) 
Observations 3,212 3,212 3,340 3,340 3,340 3,340 
% Correctly Predicted 71.33 71.30 71.19 71.17 71.19 71.17 
Area under ROC Curve 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
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